A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce Taxation by Gamage, David et al.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2013
A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce
Taxation
David Gamage




University of California, Davis
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the E-Commerce Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gamage, David; Haile, Andrew J.; and Shanske, Darien, "A Potential Game Changer in E-Commerce Taxation" (2013). Articles by
Maurer Faculty. 2434.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2434
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233751
A Potential Game Changer
In E-Commerce Taxation
by Andrew J. Haile, David Gamage, and Darien Shanske
Andrew J. Haile David Gamage Darien Shanske
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Quill decision in
1992, numerous commentators have been exhorting
Congress to resolve the problem of state taxation of
electronic commerce through federal legislation. De-
spite some recent optimism that remote seller legis-
lation1 might be included as part of a ‘‘grand bar-
gain’’ in the fiscal cliff negotiations,2 that did not
happen.3 As a result, states still lack clear authority
to require remote sellers4 to collect sales or use
taxes,5 and consequently, states continue to lose tax
revenue through the ever-increasing volume of In-
ternet commerce. With the start of the 113th Con-
gress, legislation to stem those revenue losses has
been reintroduced.6
In this essay, we first briefly describe the primary
bills that have been under consideration for Con-
gress to authorize state taxation of e-commerce
transactions with remote sellers. We then make a
series of analytic observations about those bills that
we hope will be helpful as the bills are reconsidered.
To foreshadow: two of those bills contain an impor-
tant — and we think game-changing — innovation.
That innovation is the requirement that states pro-
vide remote sellers with ‘‘adequate software’’ to
calculate use tax due within that state. That sen-
sible and achievable requirement dramatically sim-
plifies the burdens placed on remote sellers and
creates an incentive for states to simplify their sales
and use tax statutes (because the states would
ultimately bear much of the burden of complexity as
a result of their being required to provide remote
sellers with software capable of calculating sales
1‘‘Remote seller legislation’’ is used here to mean legisla-
tion intended to modify Quill’s requirement that a seller have
an in-state physical presence before the state may require the
seller to collect sales or use tax.
2Tim Devaney, ‘‘Congress Eyes Online Sales Tax,’’ The
Washington Times, Dec. 12, 2012, available at http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/2/congress-eyes-
online-sales-tax/.
3John Buhl, ‘‘Bid to Attach Sales Tax Language to Defense
Bill Fails,’’ State Tax Notes, Dec. 10, 2012, p. 793, Doc
2012-24743, or 2012 STT 233-1.
4For purposes of this article, the term ‘‘remote seller’’
means a person that sells goods or services sourced for sales
and use tax purposes to a state regarding which the seller
does not have adequate physical presence to establish nexus
under Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). That
definition is consistent with the term as used in the legisla-
tion discussed in the article. See, e.g., Fairness Act, section
6(5); Equity Act, section 5(6); Main Street Act, section 9(6).
5But note that one of us has previously argued that states
do in fact now have authority to subject remote vendors to
sales and use taxation, as long as the states adequately
compensate for all compliance costs. See David Gamage and
Devin Heckman, ‘‘A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of
E-Commerce,’’ 92 B.U. Law Rev. 483 (2012). Moreover, nu-
merous states have been using a variety of ‘‘Amazon’’ tax
strategies for circumventing Quill’s physical presence re-
quirement so as to levy sales or use taxes on transactions with
remote e-commerce vendors. For discussion, see, e.g., Andrew
J. Haile, ‘‘Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce,’’ 33 Cardozo L. Rev.
1803 (2012); David Gamage and Darien Shanske, ‘‘The Saga
of State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Reflections on the Colorado Deci-
sion,’’ State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012, p. 197, Doc 2012-13634,
or 2012 STT 136-4; Andrew J. Haile, ‘‘Defending Colorado’s
Use Tax Reporting Requirement,’’ State Tax Notes, Sept. 20,
2010, p. 761, Doc 2010-16462, or 2010 STT 181-1.
6The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 has been reintro-
duced. This column was written before the act was reintro-
duced, so we do not analyze it here. We observe, however, that
section 2(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the act requires that states seeking to
impose use tax collection outside the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement framework must ‘‘provide software free of
charge for remote sellers that calculates sales and sales and
use taxes due on each transaction.’’ Our column in effect
argues that this is a very positive change and one that should
be celebrated and refined.
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and use taxes owed). Moreover, because that re-
quirement of adequate software is so important, we
think it wise that more time be spent by the legis-
lation’s drafters on its contours. For example, will
federal courts be left to decide ‘‘adequacy’’ with no
further guidance? Providing some indication of what
is meant by ‘‘adequate software’’ may help to stem
unnecessary and wasteful future litigation.
Providing some indication of what
is meant by ‘adequate software’
may help to stem unnecessary and
wasteful future litigation.
We also believe that remote-seller legislation is
properly included in the ambit of negotiations over a
so-called grand bargain. Enabling states to reach
remote sales is manifestly a good idea as a matter of
tax policy, because it reduces horizontal inequity7
and effectively broadens the consumption tax base.
Therefore, this legislation would have the effect of
aiding states in raising revenue in a sensible way.
That could be an important ingredient of federal tax
reform given that the federal income tax is full of
subsidies to the states that arguably do not make
much sense and should be pared down. Federal
reform to curtail state subsidies will have less bite if
the states are able to offset some of the resulting lost
revenue with increased use tax collections.
Previously Introduced Legislation
Three primary versions of remote-seller legisla-
tion have been introduced in Congress in recent
years. Those bills have confusingly similar names —
the Main Street Fairness Act (the Main Street Act,
S. 1452 and H.R. 2701); the Marketplace Equity Act
(the Equity Act, H.R. 3179); and the Marketplace
Fairness Act (the Fairness Act, S. 1832). Of the
three, the Fairness Act has drawn the most recent
attention and support, probably because it is sim-
pler than the Equity Act and imposes significantly
fewer burdens on the states than does the Main
Street Act.8 The other bills have faded from consid-
eration, particularly the Main Street Act, which
requires that states join the Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Agreement before they may require remote
sellers to collect sales and use tax. Even so, a quick
comparison of these legislative proposals remains
useful if for no other purpose than to assess what
Congress is electing not to do if it enacts a new
version of the Fairness Act.
The Fairness Act
U.S. Sen. Michael B. Enzi, R-Wyo., introduced the
Fairness Act in November 2011. According to the
Fairness Act, ‘‘States should have [(i)] the ability to
enforce their existing sales and use tax laws and to
treat similar sales transactions equally, without
regard to the manner in which the sale is trans-
acted, and [(ii)] the right to collect — or decide not to
collect—taxes that are already owed under State
law.’’9 The Fairness Act would assist states in accom-
plishing these goals if the states meet either of two
requirements. First, a state could require remote
retailers to collect and remit use tax conditioned on
the state being a member state under the SSUTA.10
Alternatively, even if a state is not an SSUTA
member state, the state could still require remote
retailers to collect and remit use tax if the state
‘‘adopts and implements minimum simplification
requirements.’’11 The minimum simplification re-
quirements set forth in the Fairness Act include:12
• select a single state-level agency to administer
all sales and use tax laws;
• provide a single audit for all state and local
taxing jurisdictions within the state;
• create a single sales and use tax return to be
filed with the state-level agency selected to
administer the sales and use tax laws;
• establish a uniform sales and use tax base for
the state and local taxing jurisdictions in the
state;
• provide ‘‘adequate software and services to re-
mote sellers . . . that identifies the applicable
destination rate, including the State and local
sales tax rate (if any), to be applied on sales
sourced to the State’’13;
7Glossing over the debates about whether horizontal equi-
ty has any inherent value in its own right, we believe that
horizontal equity can be usefully applied as a guide for tax
policy with the understanding that horizontal equity can
function as a rough proxy for efficiency and other (more
fundamental) values.
8See Billy Hamilton, ‘‘Happy Birthday, SSUTA,’’ State Tax
Notes, Nov. 12, 2012, p. 513, Doc 2012-21973, or 2012 STT
219-5 (stating that the Fairness Act, ‘‘which allows states a
second path for authorization in addition the streamlined
path, may have the most support’’ of the three bills pending
before Congress). John Buhl, ‘‘NCSL Lobbies Congress for
Remote Sales Tax Bill,’’ State Tax Notes, Dec. 10, 2012, p. 793,
Doc 2012-25028, or 2012 STT 235-2.
9Fairness Act, section 2.
10Fairness Act, section 3(a). A state is not considered a
‘‘member state’’ if it is an ‘‘associate member under the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.’’ Fairness Act,
section 6(3)(B).
11Fairness Act, section 3(b).
12Fairness Act, section 3(b).
13Fairness Act, section 3(b)(1)(D)(i). We observe that the
requirement to ‘‘provide’’ appears to put the financial burden
on the states, consistent with the intention of Enzi. (‘‘The
[Fairness Act] places the burden on the state to provide
software to retailers and out-of-state sellers.’’) Frank Sha-
froth, ‘‘Breaking the E-Jam: An Interview With U.S. Sen.
Academic Perspectives on SALT
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• hold remote sellers harmless for errors or omis-
sions based on the rate information14 provided
by the state; and
• provide adequate (30 days) notice of rate
changes by any locality in the state.
The Fairness Act contains a small seller excep-
tion. Under that exception, a state may only require
use tax collection by remote sellers with ‘‘gross
annual receipts in total remote sales in the United
States in the preceding calendar year exceeding
$500,000.’’15 Formulated differently, those sellers
with less than $500,000 in U.S. remote sales will not
be required to collect any use tax in a state in which
it lacks a physical presence.
The Equity Act
Like the Fairness Act, the Equity Act would allow
states to require remote sellers to collect use tax if
they implement specific minimum requirements.
Many of the minimum requirements called for by
the Equity Act overlap with the minimum simplifi-
cation requirements of the Fairness Act, among
them:
• identification of a single revenue authority
within the state for purposes of filing a sales
and use tax return;
• creation of a unitary sales and use tax return
for filing with that revenue authority;
• establishment of a uniform tax base applicable
at both the state and local level;
• provision of ‘‘adequate software to remote
sellers that substantially eases the burden of
collecting at multiple rates within the State’’16;
and
• relief from liability for any remote seller as a
result of the seller’s reliance on information
provided by the state.
Perhaps the most significant difference between
the Equity Act and the Fairness Act is the option
allowed under the Equity Act for the state to impose
sales and use taxes on remote sellers at one of three
possible rates:
• a single statewide blended rate that includes
both the state rate and applicable rates of local
jurisdictions, as determined by the state;
• the maximum state rate, which is the highest
rate at which sellers are required by the state
to collect tax, exclusive of tax imposed by or for
the benefit of local jurisdictions; or
• the applicable destination rate, which is the
sum of the state rate and any applicable rate for
the local jurisdiction into which the sale was
made.
The Fairness Act allows only the applicable des-
tination rate, but then — like the Equity Act —
seeks to simplify the determination of the proper tax
rate by requiring that the state provide remote
sellers with software that specifies the applicable
rate for sales sourced to the state. Another difference
between the Fairness Act and the Equity Act is that
the Equity Act contains no requirement for a unitary
audit process for all state and local jurisdictions
within the state.
Finally, the Equity Act differs from the Fairness
Act in its small seller exception. Recall that the
Fairness Act exempts sellers that have less than
$500,000 in U.S. remote sales during the previous
year. The Equity Act exempts sellers if their total
remote sales in the United States are less than $1
million or their sales in the state are less than
$100,000. To illustrate the difference between the
small seller exception in the Equity Act and the
Fairness Act, a remote seller with sales of $550,000
in a state that has enacted the applicable simplifi-
cation requirements and that has no other sales in
the United States would be exempt from use tax
collection in that state under the Equity Act (be-
cause total U.S. remote sales are less than $1
million) but not under the Fairness Act (since total
U.S. remote sales exceed $500,000).
The Main Street Act
The Main Street Act differs from the Fairness Act
and the Equity Act in that it requires states to join
the SSUTA as member states, with all that entails,
before they may impose use tax collection obliga-
tions on remote sellers.17 There is no alternative
approach allowing for the imposition of a use tax
collection obligation on remote sellers, as there is
with the Fairness Act and the Equity Act.18
Michael B. Enzi,’’ State Tax Notes, Jan. 9, 2012, p. 167, Doc
2011-26251, or 2012 STT 5-4. There is room to make this
intent clearer, however, by stating, for example, ‘‘provide at no
cost.’’
14The Fairness Act does not specifically hold remote sellers
harmless for errors with the software provided by the state,
but presumably those types of errors would come within the
protection of errors in ‘‘information’’ provided by the state.
15Fairness Act, section 3(c).
16Should the state elect to use a single tax rate for remote
sales (either a statewide blended rate or the maximum state
rate, as discussed below), that adequate software require-
ment does not apply. The requirement is included to assist
sellers in determining the proper tax rate when a state uses
the more complex and variable applicable destination rate.
17Main Street Act, section 4(a).
18The Main Street Act does set forth 18 minimum simpli-
fication requirements that the SSUTA must satisfy for the
authority to require remote sellers to collect sales and use tax
to apply. Those requirements are already met under the terms
of the SSUTA.
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An overview of the SSUTA is beyond the scope of
this article,19 but one aspect of it merits some
attention — the provisions intended to assist sellers
in calculating the amount of taxes owed. Under
section 305 of the SSUTA, member states must
maintain various databases of information. In par-
ticular, section 305 requires that member states
maintain a database that provides ‘‘all sales and use
tax rates for all of the jurisdictions levying taxes
within the state’’ and another that ‘‘assigns each five
digit and nine digit ZIP code within a member state
to the proper tax rates and jurisdictions.’’20 Also,
section 328 requires that member states ‘‘complete a
taxability matrix adopted by the governing board.’’
Those taxability matrices, available online,21 pro-
vide useful information about calculating the state’s
sales tax and the taxability of a variety of goods.
Even so, the SSUTA still places the burden for
actually calculating the amount of taxes owed on the
seller and, except in certain circumstances,22 the
seller retains potential liability for errors. The re-
quirement in the Fairness Act and the Equity Act
that states provide adequate software for the calcu-
lation of use taxes owed may — depending on how
the term is ultimately construed — radically shift
that burden from sellers to states.
Simplify, Simplify
Going in reverse order, from the Main Street Act
to the Equity Act to the Fairness Act, we perceive a
sensible paring down of the legislation. Why require
SSUTA membership if the states are required to
provide adequate software? And we agree that that
software should be sufficient. If a state maintains a
baroque and complicated system, its software ex-
penses — and possible disputes with sellers — will
reflect that. After all, the deep concern of Quill was
that states would export the cost of their compli-
cated state and local tax systems onto remote sellers
many times over.23 If each state is forced to inter-
nalize its own costs so that the aggregate burden is
manageable, it is unclear what interjurisdictional
problem the dormant commerce clause is meant to
prevent, considering the costs that Quill imposes on
horizontal equity, state sovereignty, and flexibility.
Indeed, the difficulty in arriving at consensus solu-
tions to many thorny state use tax questions is
presumably the reason that so many states that levy
sales taxes — 24,24 including California and New
York — are not now full members of the SSUTA.
Why require SSUTA membership if
the states are required to provide
adequate software?
If one became fully convinced that software can
provide a complete solution to the Quill problem,
one might ask why should the federal legislation
have anything to say about the rates being imposed
by a state, as in the Equity Act. Again, if a state is
willing to bear the burden of complexity, perhaps to
encourage local initiative, it should be allowed to do
so. Indeed, we wonder whether the next step could
be to eliminate the small seller exception altogether.
If the states are required to maintain accurate
software — ideally available online — why not
require all sellers to remit the use tax?25 Presum-
ably remote sellers have ongoing online relation-
ships with many parties, for example, FedEx, and so
why not require any remote seller to log in to a
destination state’s database, enter the item and
price, and then be sent a bill monthly or quarterly or
perhaps even to sign up for a direct withdrawal from
a business credit card on file with the state?
Of course, all that would place significant pres-
sures on the adequacy of those state systems. Our
impression based on anecdotal evidence is that the
creation of those systems, which large multistate
firms already maintain (or contract for), will not
pose too onerous a technological challenge — assum-
ing that states budget sufficient resources and that
political obstacles do not arise. Indeed, many private
providers of software have already been certified by
the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, consis-
tent with sections 501 and 502 of the SSUTA.26 The
states will also have to ensure that the right infor-
mation is getting inputted into any system, however
technically advanced; for example, that a local sales
tax rate has been increased. We believe that states
will have the incentive to get those programs right,
19See, e.g., Hellerstein and Hellerstein, State Taxation
section 19A (2012).
20SSUTA section 305(E), (F).
21See http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page
=state-taxability-matricies.
22Under SSUTA section 306, remote sellers are relieved
from liability if they erroneously calculate taxes owed based
on information provided by the state.
23David Gamage and Devin Heckman, ‘‘Vendor Compen-
sation as an Approach for State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Part 2,’’ State




25To be workable, this approach might need to require the
states to register their software with a central clearinghouse
so that small businesses can easily find and access the
software for any states they sell into. However, a full discus-
sion of whether it might make sense to eliminate the small
seller exception is beyond the scope of this essay. We merely
mean to raise the possibility here.
26See http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=
Certified-Service-Providers.
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but that nevertheless thought should still be given
to how the law of software adequacy will be devel-
oped.
There are many possible options to be considered;
we will list only a few. Most simply, federal legisla-
tion can seek to consolidate where cases about
adequacy are to be heard, say in the Court of Federal
Claims, as in section 5 of the Main Street Act. We
hope that consolidation would lead to the quicker
development of a more unified jurisprudence. Con-
gress might also consider giving more statutory
detail to the adequacy requirement, perhaps similar
to SSUTA section 501(C). Given the complexity of
that area, Congress could consider giving a federal
agency power to issue regulations or, since there is
not an obvious choice, Congress could create a spe-
cial interstate taxation governing board. Of course,
once Congress is inclined to go in that direction,
considering some way of piggybacking on the work
already done by the Streamlined Sales Tax Govern-
ing Board makes a great deal of sense.
There remains an important role
for the SSUTA to play — though
not the role originally envisioned.
That brings us squarely back to the matter of the
SSUTA, which was itself supposed to be the answer
to Quill. In general, we believe that technology now
has the potential to largely solve the Quill problem
— a problem that was made much more severe by
technology to begin with. There is little need to
simplify ex ante as long as states are required to
internalize the costs they create ex post through
maintaining adequate software.27 As just indicated,
however, adequacy will not be self-defining or en-
forcing. We think that federal courts could do a good
job if given a bit more direction, but we can also
envision a role for a state software adequacy initia-
tive, perhaps under the auspices of the SSUTA
(perhaps a new category of membership just regard-
ing software?). It is important to think through the
possible role for the SSUTA sooner rather than later
because we can foresee some of the states in the
SSUTA possibly withdrawing after the passage of
federal remote seller legislation if states prefer the
adequate software alternative. It would be a shame
for the SSUTA to fall apart just when national
streamlining of sales and use taxes finally becomes
practical, and when there remains an important role
for the SSUTA to play — though not, of course, the
role originally envisioned.
A Big Deal
Today’s fiscal politics is governed by discussions
of ‘‘grand bargains.’’ Many of those reform proposals,
particularly those targeting so-called tax expendi-
tures, may affect state and local finances. We do
think that at least some of those reform proposals
might be worth adopting, despite the negative effect
they would have on state and local government
revenue. Take the state and local tax deduction.28
Suppose the federal government saved (say) $20
billion a year through capping the value of that
deduction for higher-income taxpayers.29 That could
result in the states losing significant revenue, at
least in the short and medium run. Allowing states
to collect sales and use tax from remote sellers might
thus be an opportunity for the federal government to
give states a compensating revenue source that is
consistent with sound tax policy even as the federal
government tightens its belt. ✰
27In this sense, the requirement that states maintain
adequate software functions similarly to the argument that
one of us has made previously that states should be permitted
to subject remote vendors to their sale and use tax regimes
conditional on the states fully compensating remote vendors
for all compliance costs. See Gamage and Heckman, supra
note 23. A discussion of the relative merits of the adequate
software requirement as opposed to an adequate vendor
compensation requirement is beyond the scope of this essay.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the adequate
software requirement seems more politically feasible at the
moment, in terms of potential federal legislation. All of us
agree that the adequate software requirement offers a suffi-
ciently promising path forward such that, even to the extent
that an adequate vendor compensation requirement might
arguably be preferable, we would strongly support federal
remote seller legislation containing a well-developed ad-
equate software requirement.
28IRC section 164.
29Alternatively, one of us has argued that were the SALT
deduction to be capped only for state and local income taxes,
that might make sense for both the federal government and
the states, by benefiting the federal government’s bottom line
and also potentially aiding the states in the long run by
nudging them to adopt revenue systems less reliant on
particularly volatile income taxes. See Darien Shanske, ‘‘How
Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income Tax to Stabilize
State and Local Finance,’’ 31 Virginia Tax Review 413 (2012).
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